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RAWLS' THEORY OF JUSTICE
ThomAS M. SCANLON, JR.t
Rawls' book is a comprehensive and systematic presentation of a
particular ideal of social life. The aim of the book is to analyze this
ideal in a way that allows us to see clearly how it differs from prominent
alternatives and on what grounds it may be preferred to them. In
carrying out this analysis Rawls presents and draws upon not only a
theory of distributive justice and a theory of political rights, but also
a theory of value, a theory of obligation and a theory of moral
psychology.
Contemporary political philosophy has already been altered by
Rawls' book, but the leading ideas of his theory are in a number of
respects familiar ones. They are familiar within the philosophical
community since they have been set forth by Rawls in a series of
important and influential articles over the course of the last fifteen
years.' Rawls has altered and clarified important points in his argu-
ment since these articles first appeared, and the book presents a large
amount of new material, but the main thrust of Rawls' theory can be
seen in these shorter works. The idea of Rawls' book will also seem
familiar to many who have not read his articles, for the ideal of social
life he describes is one that lies at the heart of liberal political theory,
and the principles and policies which this ideal supports are, in general,
ones that liberals have traditionally supported. Finally, the central
analytical device in Rawls' argument is a variant of the familiar idea
of a social contract. Such a contract is perhaps most often thought
of in connection with accounts of the origins of political authority.
While Rawls does give an account of political obligation (one which
does not require actual consent) his use of the idea of accepting insti-
tutions in an initial contractual situation is not confined to this purpose
but serves more broadly as the basis for critical appraisal of economic,
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social and political institutions. Rawls' work thus develops and carries
forward in a systematic way that branch of contract theory represented
by Kant and Rousseau, who saw the idea of a hypothetical initial
agreement as a necessary condition for the legitimacy of political
institutions.
In this study I will present and discuss what I take to be the
most important arguments of Rawis' book, emphasizing in each case
the way in which these arguments are related to the ideal of social
life which forms the core of his theory. I will begin with a discussion
of Rawls' method and overall aims. In Section II I will consider his
arguments against what he calls perfectionism and in favor of his
thesis of the priority of liberty. Section III is concerned with his
arguments against utilitarianism and Section IV with his thesis that
social and economic inequalities are just only if they work to the
advantage of the worst-off members of society.
I. RAWLS' PROGRAM AND METHOD
Principles of justice, according to Rawls, are principles which
"provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions
of society and .. .define the appropriate distribution of the benefits
and burdens of social cooperation."' One can think of principles of
justice as instruments of theoretical criticism and practical choice,
guiding our appraisal of different social institutions, but it is essential
to think of such principles also as one of the crucial operative elements
in a functioning set of institutions. This is the perspective taken by
Rawls and expressed in his notion of a well-ordered society.
Now let us say that a society is well-ordered when it is
not only designed to advance the good of its members but
when it is also effectively regulated by a public conception
of justice. That is, it is a society in which (1) everyone ac-
cepts and knows that the others accept the same principles
of justice, and (2) the basic social institutions generally
satisfy and are generally known to satisfy these principles.
In this case while men may put forth excessive demands on
one another, they nevertheless acknowledge a common point
of view from which their claims may be adjudicated. If
men's inclination to self-interest makes their vigilance against
one another necessary, their public sense of justice makes
their secure association together possible. Among individuals
with disparate aims and purposes a shared conception of
justice establishes the bonds of civic friendship; the general
desire for justice limits the pursuit of other ends. One may
2 J. RAwLS, A THEORY OP JUSTICE 4 (1971) [hereinafter cited as RAwLS].
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think of a public conception of justice as constituting the
fundamental charter of a well-ordered human association.'
The idea of an agreement on principles or procedures which stands
behind conflicts of interest and provides the basis for their resolution
is, in various forms, a familiar one. One may think of such an agree-
ment as something which just grows up in fortunate circumstances or
as something inherited from tradition, but the content of such an
agreement is clearly subject to rational scrutiny. It is a comprehensible
question whether some principles of justice are rationally to be pre-
ferred to-others for the crucial social role Rawls assigns to them. This
question is not immediately answerable, however, without some con-
sideration of what the appropriate standards are for such a far-reaching
and headily abstract choice.
Rawls' approach to this problem is analogous to what must have
been the dream of many an arbitrator: to separate the contending
parties in a dispute and to force them somehow to come to an agree-
ment on principles which they would accept in general as a basis for
the adjudication of disputes of the kind in which they are involved.
In arranging such an argument-within-an-argument an arbitrator might
have a number of different aims in view. First, as a practical matter,
he wants the parties to come to some agreement on principles and he
wants this agreement to be one that will actually hold up when the
principles are applied to particular cases. In addition, he may have
his own views as to which principles should be chosen, views about
particular substantive decisions these principles should or should not
dictate, and views about the kinds of considerations which it is relevant
for such principles to give weight to and the kinds of considerations
good principles should ignore. The arbitrator's problem is to devise
the ground rules for the argument-within-an-argument and provide
incentives to the parties in such a way as to ensure that these aims
will be met.
What Rawls calls the Original Position can be seen as a construc-
tion on this model, and the chief strategic device it employs to achieve
its alms is the notion of choice behind a partial veil of ignorance. The
parties in the Original Position know that they are contemporaries in
some society. While they do not know any details of the circumstances
prevailing in this society, they do know that these circumstances are
ones in which cooperation is both possible and necessary, and they
have full access to general truths of social science telling them how
social institutions work and the difficulties to which they are subject.
3 Id. 4-5.
RAWLS' THEORY OF JUSTICE
The parties do not know their own places in their society, their par-
ticular talents and skills or even their own conceptions of the good
(i.e. their tastes, goals and objectives). They are supposed to be ra-
tional and to be mutually disinterested in the sense that in their choice
of principles they are not motivated either by sympathy or by envy,
but rather each by a desire to do as well for himself as he can.
Since the parties do not know their own conceptions of the good,
there is a problem of specifying the terms in which they are to under-
stand judgments of relative well-being. Rawls' strategy here is to focus
on certain categories of goods which it is rational to want no matter
what one's conception of the good may be. A good may have this prop-
erty either because, like self-respect, it has a central place in any con-
ception of the good or because, like income and liberty, it is necessary
as a means to most other things one may desire. Some goods which
are neutrally desirable in this sense, such as a sound constitution or
good eyes, are not things whose allotment is a function of social insti-
tutions (although they are to some extent dependent on the circum-
stances of one's life). Neutrally desirable goods whose allotment is
directly dependent on social institutions are what Rawls calls primary
social goods.4 He lists these as rights and liberties, powers and oppor-
tunities, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect. Since Rawls
uses primary social goods as an index of relative well-being, he needs
to claim not only that these goods are things which it is rational for
anyone to want no matter what his conception of the good may be, but
also that there is at least a rough ranking of "bundles" of such goods
which is similarly neutral, i.e., a ranking of combinations of primary
goods (so much income, certain liberties, etc.) as "greater" and
"smaller" such that it is rational for anyone to prefer a "greater"
allotment of primary social goods to a "smaller" one.5
In addition to wanting for themselves the largest possible bundle
of primary social goods, the parties are assumed to be motivated to
choose principles which it will be rational and psychologically possible
for them to adhere to, and principles which will provide the basis for
a stable and lasting social order by generating their own psychological
base of support; i.e., it is supposed that the parties will make their
choices only after they have determined that persons growing up in
a society governed by their chosen principles will naturally acquire a
sense of justice motivating them to act in accord with those principles.
4 Id. 62, 92.
5 This problem, which Rawls calls the index problem for primary goods, is discussed
at id. 93-95.
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Rawls puts forward the following Two Principles as the principles
of justice that would be chosen in the Original Position:
[First Principle]
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
total system of basic liberties compatible with a similar system
of liberty for all.6
[Second Principle]
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that
they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advan-
taged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.7
It would be a mistake to see Rawls' argument as proceeding de-
ductively, first from the description of the role of a conception of justice
in a well-ordered society to the idea of the Original Position as a means
for choosing the (instrumentally) best such conception, and thence to
the Two Principles of justice as the particular conception which passes
this test. To construe Rawls' argument in this way would be a mistake
first because, as he emphasizes,' his argument does not proceed only
in this direction. The choice of the constraints which define the Original
Position is guided initially by the idea of the role that justice is to
play in a well-ordered society and by strategic considerations designed
to insure that some agreement is reached. But these constraints are
also trimmed and shaped to insure that the Original Position will yield
results which conform with our considered judgments of what is just
and unjust in particular cases. What is sought is not a proof of the
Two Principles but a setting out of their relations, on the one hand,
to our considered judgments of justice and, on the other, to certain
general ideas of social cooperation. Each of the elements in such a
total picture, and the way in which all of them fit together, elucidates
and provides support for the others. Such a method of reasoning is
not viciously circular since it is not assumed, nor is it by any means
obvious from the outset, that our considered judgments of justice and
our most general notions about social cooperation can be fitted together
in a systematic and cohesive way.
The second reason why it would be a mistake to see Rawls' strat-
egy as deductive is that some of the most likely alternatives to the
Old. 250.
7Id. 83. This principle is advanced as the favored interpretation of the more ambig-
uous principle that "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are
both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions
and offices open to all." Id. 60. On the relation of these two formulations of clause (a),
see note 68 infra.
8 Id. 20, 21.
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Two Principles of justice appear to be ruled out by the form of the
Original Position itself or by the very idea of a well-ordered society
as one in which conflicts are regulated by a notion of justice in the
way Rawls describes. Two examples will be helpful here: first, it may
seem to many that to take as an ideal a "well-ordered society" in
which conflicts of interest arise and are settled with reference to prin-
ciples of justice chosen on the basis of their appeal to parties whose
main motivation is each to secure as much as possible for himself is
already to build in too many features of the societies with which we
are most familiar. Ruled out without serious consideration, it may be
thought, is the possibility of a society in which the sources of major
conflict are largely eliminated and in which the basis of association
lies in relations of love and sympathy rather than in principles of
distributive justice.
Second, the possibility of a society in which the ruling principles
are given by a particular religious ideal or a particular secular ideal of
human excellence appears to be ruled out in the Original Position by
the requirement that the parties are ignorant of their own conceptions
of the good. But if judgments of relative value are not just matters of
taste and opinion but also of objective fact, then it appears to be ir-
rational (and tendentious) to block consideration of such facts from
the deliberations of the parties in the Original Position.
It would not be unreasonable to say that these two objections
represent alternative social ideals-which I will call, respectively,
communitarian and perfectionist-which are not merely rivals to
Rawls' Two Principles of justice for consideration in the Original
Position but rivals to the outlook represented by the Original Position
itself. If Rawls is not to be construed as begging the question against
these alternatives, then he cannot be construed as following the deduc-
tive strategy outlined above.
Rawls' response to the communitarian challenge proceeds along
two related lines. First he argues that it is a mistake to see love and
sympathy as in themselves rivals to justice as guides for social action.
These feelings may move us to sacrifice for others, but in themselves
they provide no guide to the degree of sacrifice appropriate, no guide
as to which of two loving persons should in a given case make way for
the other, and, most clearly, no guide to how one should act when the
interests of two loved persons come into conflict.9 Second, Rawls argues
that the natural attitudes of love and trust themselves presuppose a
conception of what it is to respect another as a distinct person, i.e. a
9 Id. 191.
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notion of justice of the kind which the Original Position construction
is designed to capture."° If these arguments are correct, then a com-
munitarian ideal of social life of the kind I have described is not, at
the fundamental level, an alternative to cooperation on terms of justice.
It consists rather in putting new flesh on the bones which a theory of
justice provides.
Differences between the two outlooks remain, however, which are
too deep to be called mere matters of emphasis. The communitarian
may be understood as asking in part how far a healthy society could
rely upon justice in its distributive sense as the main counterforce to
certain tensions and instabilities. The most important question, the
communitarian contends, is not whether the institutions maintain
strict distributive justice; it is whether they provide a basis for healthy
human relations or whether, on the contrary, they foster social rela-
tions which are antithetical to the growth of natural attitudes of love,
sympathy and trust. Rawls argues that the connection between justice
and the values of community is much more intimate than this criticism
would suggest. Through the adoption of his Two Principles as a public
conception of justice, Rawis argues, the members of a society express
their respect for one another as moral persons; moreover, since the
Second Principle constitutes "an undertaking to regard the distribution
of natural abilities as a collective asset so that the more fortunate are
to benefit only in ways that help those who have lost out,"" this prin-
ciple embodies an idea of fraternity.:" Thus, he maintains, a well-
ordered society founded on these principles is a community in a strong
sense, a social union in which each person may pursue his own good
within a form of association which is itself a good for all.'3 I cannot
consider these arguments in detail here; some will be treated at greater
length below in the discussion of the Two Principles themselves. My
present purpose in this example has been merely to indicate how the
force of Rawls' theory depends not only on the details of the deriva-
tion of his principles in the Original Position, but also and more impor-
tantly on the coherent view of social cooperation which the theory as
a whole provides, in this case particularly on the related accounts of
moral psychology, of the concept of a person and of the idea of the
good.
1ld. 486-87.
11 Id. 179.
121d. log.
13 Id. 522-29.
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II. LIBERTY
A. The Argument Against Perfectionism
Those theories which Rawls calls perfectionist direct us "to ar-
range institutions and to define the duties and obligations of individuals
so as to maximize the achievement of human excellence in art, science,
and culture." 14 In my previous remarks I have grouped such theories
together with theories which take as the ruling aim of social institu-
tions the promotion of a particular religious ideal. This grouping may
seem somewhat unfair since there is in theories of the first sort a strong
tendency toward elitism-i.e. towards placing much greater emphasis
on the needs and interests of some members of society than on those of
others-and while some religious-based theories may exhibit a tendency
of this kind in singling out a small group (e.g. "the elect" or the clergy)
for special privileges, this need not be regarded as a characteristic
feature of the type.
What all of these theories, religious and secular, share is first of
all a teleological structure:' 15 once the value of a certain end is estab-
lished, social institutions are to be appraised strictly on the basis of
their tendency to promote this end. In addition, quite apart from
tendencies to elitism, all of these theories raise serious problems con-
cerning individual liberty: institutions which preserve the opportunity
for each person to adopt and pursue his own interests and ideals and to
try to persuade others to follow him will be justified on perfectionist
grounds only to the extent that they are the most effective means to
the promotion of the given end.
Now it would be possible to reject theories of this kind simply on
the basis of their tendency to support institutions which conflict with
our considered judgments of justice, and then to design the Original
Position in such a way that the offending theories are ruled out. Adopted
alone, however, this strategy is not wholly satisfying. If we can give
no independent rationale for the design of the Original Position then
this maneuver appears somewhat ad hoc. To provide such a rationale,
based on a non-perfectionist ideal of social cooperation, would not
constitute a refutation of perfectionism; but without such a rationale
we are left with no response to the basic theoretical challenge which
these theories raise: If there is an objective difference in the intrinsic
value of different talents, goals and pursuits why should not informa-
tion about these differences be used by the parties in the Original
Position as the basis for their choice of the principles by which social
14 Id. 325.
1 5 The notion of a teleological theory is discussed more fully in Section IV infra.
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institutions will be judged? How, in short, can we defend an egalitarian
or libertarian position without embracing some form of skepticism
about values?
Rawls' response to this challenge (and his rationale for the design
of the Original Position) is grounded in the notion that social institu-
tions are just only if they can be defended to each of their members
on the basis of the contribution they make to his good as assessed
from his point of view. We must be able to say to each member that
the arrangements he is asked to accept provide as well for him as they
possibly can, consistent with satisfying the parallel demands of others.
In order to spell out this idea more fully it is necessary first to consider
Rawls' analysis of the notion of an individual person's good.16
Those experiences, ends and activities are components in the good
for a particular individual, Rawls argues, which have an important
place in a plan of life which it would be rational for him to choose.
Now it may seem that a person could be said rationally to choose a
plan of life (if at all) only after he has developed a conception of his
own good, on the basis of which he can judge and rank alternative
plans of life. But Rawls argues, persuasively I think, that this is not
the case. In real life our deliberations about those actual choices which,
taken together, determine our plan of life proceed on the basis of
knowledge of our present tastes and capacities, knowledge of what
things we have in the past found satisfying, and knowledge of general
principles governing the ways in which our tastes and capacities are
subject to growth and change over time. This information allows us
to decide on courses of action not only with the aim of satisfying our
current desires but also with the knowledge and intent that our choices
will be instrumental in determining what interests, talents and desires
we will come to have in the future. Long range choices such as the
choice of a career or a place to live give perhaps the best example of
choices which, because they may be foreseen to have far-reaching
effects on our interests and objectives, must be made on some basis
which goes beyond the satisfaction of our current desires and specific
interests.
Rawls puts forward a negative and a positive thesis about this
process of deliberation. The negative thesis consists of an attack on
the idea that there must be some single overriding general goal (e.g.
the maximization of satisfaction or happiness) which underlies all of
our deliberations and explains how we can compare and choose be-
tween disparate alternatives.17 The positive thesis consists of a sketch
16See generally RAwLs 60-65.
L7Id. §§ 83-84.
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of standards of rationality with reference to which our choices, par-
ticularly those most general and far-reaching choices described as
choices between alternative life plans, can be criticized. This sketch
consists of two parts. First, there are general principles of rational
choice according to which it is irrational, e.g., for anyone to prefer
plan of life A to plan of life B if B involves the development of exactly
the same interests and desires as A and provides for their satisfaction
at a markedly higher level. Not all of these principles, which Rawls
calls "counting principles," are as uncontroversial as this example, but
all are fairly weak, and taken together they by no means can be ex-
pected to determine a unique plan as the only rational choice for a
person to make. A choice from among the plans not ruled out by these
principles (the set of maximal plans) will involve such things as com-
paring the relative intensity of different desires and the relative value
for us of different kinds of accomplishments. For this choice there are
on Rawls' view no principles of rationality which directly require a
choice of some plans over others. The only relevant standards concern
the manner in which the choice is made-whether the relevant evidence
has been duly weighed, the possible sources of uncertainty and error
properly discounted for, etc. These criteria are grouped together by
Rawls under the heading "deliberative rationality."
Thus, to say that a certain thing is, objectively, a good for a
certain person is, on Rawls' analysis, 8 to say that it would be a promi-
nent feature in a plan of life which that person would hypothetically
choose, with deliberative rationality, from among the class of maximal
plans. Under any actual conditions, of course, not only the means for
attaining those things which are goods for us, but also ideal conditions
for determining what things are such goods, will in some measure be
lacking. What the parties in Rawls' Original Position look for in a
society is not only the means for securing those things, whatever they
may be, which are objectively components of their good, but also the
conditions necessary for determining what these goods are.
From the fact that the parties in Rawls' Original Position sup-
pose that as members of a society they will choose their own plan of
life, and hence also determine their own conception of the good, it
should not be thought that they suppose themselves to be independent
of social forces which will in large part shape and influence the choices
they make. It would be idle to deny that such influences exist, and
irrational to object to all such influences as interfering with one's
liberty. But it is still reasonable to prefer some institutions to others
Is Id. 417.
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on grounds of the conditions they provide for rationally forming a
conception of one's good. Obviously one may reasonably object, simply
on grounds of efficiency, to institutions which place arbitrary obstacles
and difficulties in the way of individuals' attempts to get a clear view
of the alternatives open to them, of their own potentialities, and of
what they and others can expect from various courses of action. A
more difficult case is presented by the fact that some features of insti-
tutions will not merely be random inferences but can be seen clearly
to favor certain choices and to discourage others, and to do this not
by just enlarging people's views or by approaching "ideal conditions"
thereby favoring "the correct answer," but rather by skewing the evi-
dence available or by restricting the alternatives likely to be considered,
or by affecting people's deliberations in other more subtle and indirect
ways. Systematic interference of this kind might be the result of rela-
tively fixed impersonal features of institutional arrangements. Alterna-
tively, certain individuals may be charged with overseeing and main-
taining these influences through censorship or other devices.
It is one of the features of perfectionist views which strike us
intuitively as objectionable that such views may authorize the use of
means of this sort in order to produce individuals conforming to a
particular ideal. Now we cannot simply reject as involving unaccept-
able "conditioning" all social institutions which mold a person's choices
and beliefs without his consent with the aim of bringing him closer to
some ideal. Certainly Rawls cannot do this. For as he himself says,
his own view involves a certain ideal of the person, and he is at some
pains to show 9 that there are psychological laws which give us reason
to believe that persons growing up in a well-ordered society governed
by his Two Principles of justice will naturally acquire what he calls
a sense of justice-the tendency to understand and be motivated by
considerations of justice as specified by those principles. The action
of these psychological laws is in part dependent upon the intellectual
activity of the person on whom they are acting, but is also in large
part something which happens to a person without his knowledge or
rational scrutiny.
How then is one to distinguish among the various ways in which
social institutions may be arranged to influence the choices and beliefs
of their members without each member's consent? Can one distinguish
acceptable from unacceptable influences of this kind on any basis other
than an appraisal of the relative value of the particular types of per-
sons these influences produce? The appropriate standards for making
191d. §§ 51-59.
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this distinction on Rawls' theory seem to me to be suggested by the
criteria he offers for distinguishing justifiable from unjustifiable pater-
nalism2 o The relevant principles here require first that paternalistic
interventions, i.e. interventions in a person's life "for his own sake"
which are pursued contrary to his wishes or without his knowledge,
have to be rationally justifiable to him after the fact. Second, such
interventions must be justified on the grounds that the subject's evi-
dent failure or absence of reason and will at the time rules out a
direct presentation of the issues to him for his own rational considera-
tion and decision. A third requirement is that the intervention "must
be guided by the principles of justice and what is known about the
subject's more permanent aims and preferences" 21 or, failing such
knowledge, by some neutral standard such as that provided by the
primary goods.
While Rawls formulates these requirements specifically for the
case of paternalistic action by one person toward another, they seem
to be applicable as well to the broader class of interventions we are
considering. This is indicated, for example, in the fact that Rawls'
defense of the process by which a sense of justice is inculcated in
persons who grow up in a well-ordered society governed by his Two
Principles of justice advances considerations essentially parallel to
these requirements.22 One can maintain here, first, that the principles
which form the content of this sense of justice are ones the person
can later come to see as justified. (This fact alone, of course, would
not be an adequate defense since any successful piece of indoctrination,
or at least any successful indoctrination of justifiable beliefs, could
make this claim.) Further, the practices of moral education in a well-
ordered society proceed as far as possible by appeal to the subject's
reason, and rely upon other factors only insofar as the natural limita-
tions of childhood make necessary. Finally, the acquisition of a sense
of justice is, it is argued, not inconsistent with a person's good. Since
the conception of justice (i.e. Rawls') which is the content of the
sense of justice in question provides a secure protection for each per-
son's interests and for his desire to determine his own conception of
the good, the acquisition of such a sense of justice is not something
which leaves a person open to exploitation or manipulation by others.
In addition, having a sense of justice .is a necessary condition for shar-
ing fully in the life of a well-ordered society 8 and a necessary condi-
2 0 Id. 249-50.
21 Id. 250.
22 Id. 514-15.
231d. 571.
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tion as well for susceptibility to the natural attitudes of friendship,
love and trust 2 4 These are things, Rawis argues, which almost2 5 anyone
has reason to want.
Without going fully into the arguments for these claims, we may
compare them to the case which might be made on perfectionist grounds
for features of social institutions designed to mold or restrict the choices
of their members so as to promote a particular secular or religious
ideal. There is a clear sense in which such features will have a rational
justification: they will be justifiable on the basis of the objective value
of the particular ideal in question. A perfectionist might thus maintain
that the interferences with a person's liberty which these features
represent are ones which he should, rationally, come to accept. But
the justification which is offered by the perfectionist will not neces-
sarily be one which claims that these features promote the good of
the person whose liberty is restricted or which claims that they are
consistent with his desire to determine his own conception of the
good; it is apt to appeal instead to some impersonal scheme of values.
Moreover, this justification need not be based on considerations which
would be agreed upon by almost anyone regardless of his conception
of the good. Rather, it is likely to be based on one specific conception
of the good which, even if it is objectively correct, may nonetheless
be something which is a matter of some disagreement among rational
adults in the society in question. Indeed, it is just the fact that this
conception of the good, though correct, does not compel general
agreement, which may be taken on perfectionist grounds to make
necessary the intervention in question. On Rawls' theory, however,
such interventions are permitted only when there is "evident failure
or absence of reason and will," a phrase intended to cover cases such
as infancy, insanity or coma which involve major diminution of ra-
tional capacities relative to the standard of "a normal adult in full
possession of his faculties."
Thus, while Rawls' theory bases principles of justice on a hypo-
thetical choice made by persons who may appear to 'be standing tem-
porarily outside any particular society, the point of view which the
theory takes as fundamental is actually that of a person in society.
The parties in the Original Position do not act from special wisdom
or knowledge which enables them to make choices which they later,
as persons under the limiting and distorting conditions of real life in
an actual society, will have to take on faith. Rather, the parties' aim
2 4
1d. 570.
25 Rawls does allow for the possibility that there may be "some persons for whom
the affirmation of their sense of justice is not a good." Id. 575.
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is to make choices which they, as real citizens, will have reason to
accept. Each party therefore regards his own judgment as a real citizen
as sovereign-not as infallible or immune from limitations, but as the
basis from which his life will be lived, his choices made and his work as
ideal contractor appraised.
Rawls remarks that "embedded in the principles of justice there
is an ideal of the person that provides an Archimedean Point for
judging the basic structure of society."26 Although I have not described
this ideal in full, the preceding argument seems to me to illustrate part
of the force of this remark. The ideal of each person as a rational
chooser of his own ends and plans provides an Archimedean Point
partly in virtue of the fact that this conception of a person is taken
to be prior to any particular independently-determined conception of
his good. One need not be a skeptic about values or truth to hold
that each of us does in fact look at himself in this way. If this is so,
then the assumption that the parties in the Original Position adopt
this view of themselves should seem a natural one, and the fact that
certain principles of social cooperation involve the recognition of each
member of society as in this sense a sovereign equal, while others in-
volve the denial of this status to at least some members, should seem
a fact of some importance.
The conception of the person described by Rawls is of course not
an Archimedean Point in the sense of being itself a notion formed
outside of or independent of particular social and historical circum-
stances. It may well be that this conception of the person and the
ideal of social cooperation founded on it are typical of particular his-
torical eras and civilizations. But this is not in itself an objection to
Rawls' theory, particularly if, as it seems to me, the conception of
the person in question is one that has a particularly deep hold on us
and is not a matter of great controversy or of significant variation
across the range of societies to which the theory should be expected
to apply. The question is not whether this conception of the person
is in some sense absolute, but whether the particular features of this
conception that are appealed to in Rawls' argument are more contro-
versial than the conclusions they are used to support.
Certainly this conception of the person involves a number of
important parameters which must be fixed before the notion can be
appealed to in support of conclusions about the justice or injustice of
particular institutions. The most obvious of these is the standard of
rationality: what is to count, for example, as "evident failure or
26Id. 261-69, 584.
19731
1034 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:1020
absence or reason or will"? Other parameters are represented by the
general facts of social science which the parties in the Original Position
use in reaching their conclusions, by the notion of the primary social
goods, and by other appeals to the idea that certain goods or circum-
stances are to be desired "no matter what one's conception of the good
may be." The latter appeals depend upon some idea of the normal
range of variation in conceptions of the good and upon some idea of
the means and conditions required for the pursuit of these goods. All
of these may be subject to some variation over time and social circum-
stances. But here again the theory need make no claim to absoluteness
in these matters. It is sufficient to ask whether the appeals the theory
makes to facts about persons and the circumstances of human life are
controversial for us; in particular, whether the facts appealed to are
more controversial than the conclusions at issue; and finally, whether
the ways in which conclusions about the justice of institutions are
made to depend on such facts strike us as plausible.
Much of the preceding discussion has been internal to Rawls'
particular conception of social cooperation and is thus not in any
proper sense a refutation of perfectionism. It is, rather, a description
of an alternative ideal of social life, one -which might be called "co-
operation on a footing of justice." The development of this ideal en-
ables Rawls to move beyond the observation that perfectionism seems
to support arrangements which are at variance with our intuitive judg-
ments of justice to a theory which explains why this should be so and
provides a point of view from which we can see how the perfectionist
challenge can be answered.
B. The Priority of Liberty
I turn now from these theoretical issues to consideration of Rawls'
more specific conclusions concerning the place of liberty in just institu-
tions. Rawls' substantive account of justice is put forward in two forms
which he calls respectively the General Conception and the Special
Conception of Justice as Fairness. The General Conception of Justice
as Fairness provides that "[a]ll social primary goods-liberty and
opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect-are to
be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of
these goods is to the advantage of the least favored." 7 The Special
Conception is expressed in the two principles of justice stated earlier,2"
with the proviso that the First Principle is to be held prior to the
27 Id. 303.
28 Text accompanying note 7 supra.
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Second in a sense to be discussed more fully below. The Second Prin-
ciple allows for inequalities in the distribution of goods other than
basic liberties on terms similar to those specified by the General
Conception, but the First Principle lays down a more stringent require-
ment of equality in basic liberties, a requirement which is not to be
set aside for the sake of greater economic or social benefits. This
principle and the rule specifying its priority receive their final state-
ment in the following form.
First Principle
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar
system of liberty for all.
Priority Rule
The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical order29
and therefore liberty can be restricted only for the sake of
liberty. There are two cases: (a) a less extensive liberty
must strengthen the total system of liberty shared by all,
and (b) a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those
citizens with the lesser liberty.80
The "basic liberties" with which the First Principle is concerned
are specified by Rawls as follows.
The basic liberties of citizens are, roughly speaking, political
liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for public office)
together with freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of
conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person
along with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom
from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept
of the rule of law. These liberties are all required to be equal
by the first principle, since citizens of a just society are to
have the same basic rights.3
A liberty in the sense in which Rawls uses the term is defined by
a complex of rights along with correlative duties of others to aid or
not to interfere. Thus, by a restriction on liberty or an unequal
liberty he means a restriction or inequality in what people are legally
entitled to do (or, perhaps, entitled to do by the nonlegal rules defining
the basic institutions of their society). Inequalities in people's ability
29 "This is an order which requires us to satisfy the first principle in the ordering
before we can move on to the second . . . . A principle does not come into play until
those previous to it are either fully met or do not apply." RAwLs 43. For Rawls'
initial statement of the Second Principle, see text accompanying note 7 supra.
3 0 RAwLs 250 (footnote added).
31 Id. 61.
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to take advantage of their rights due, e.g., to unequal economic means
do not count as inequalities in liberty for Rawls but rather as
inequalities in what he calls the "worth" or "value" of liberty. While
the basic liberties must be held equally, the worth of these liberties
may vary since any significant inequality in wealth, income or
authority (allowed under the Second Principle) will represent an
inequality in the ability of citizens to make use of their liberty in
order to advance their ends."2 Rawls stresses at a number of points33
the importance of preserving "the fair value" of the basic liberties,
particularly political liberties, but strict equality in the worth of these
liberties is not required by the First Principle itself.
Two examples, frequently cited by Rawls, of restrictions on basic
liberties that are justified on the ground that they strengthen the total
system of basic liberty are the restrictions on the scope of majority
rule imposed by a bill of rights and the restrictions on the freedom
to speak imposed by a system of rules of order. In the first case a
restriction of the legal powers of citizens is justified by the fact that
more extensive powers could legally erase other basic liberties. In
the second case what are sometimes called restrictions as to time,
place and manner are imposed on the exercise of a basic liberty in
order, Rawls says, to preserve the worth of that liberty to all.' Thus
it appears that while equal worth of the basic liberties is not required
by the First Principle, securing the worth of these liberties is one of
the goals which can justify restrictions on basic liberties under the
Priority Rule. 5
1. The Preference for Basic Liberties over
Other Primary Goods
Given the degree to which the content of the Priority Rule, and
hence the claim of Rawls' theory to provide a secure basis for liberty,
depends upon the distinction between the basic liberties and other
goods and opportunities, it may seem surprising that no theoretical
account of this distinction is offered. The list of familiar constitutional
categories given above is offered by Rawls not as a precise enumera-
tion of the class of basic liberties but only as indicating "roughly
32 Id. 204.
33 E.g., id. 224-26, 277-78.
3 4 
Id. 203.
35 Both of the cases considered here are examples of a lesser but still equal liberty
as provided for by clause (a) of the Priority Rule. Primary examples of unequal liberty
allowed by clause (b) seem to be cases of "justifiable paternalism" in which a less than
equal liberty is "acceptable to those whose liberty is restricted" in the sense spelled
out in the requirements discussed above. See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
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speaking" what this class is to include. I suspect that here, as with
the class of primary goods itself, no precise theoretical demarcation
can be given. What is claimed for these liberties is just that, due
both to the importance for anyone of the interests they safeguard
and to their great instrumental value for the enjoyment of other goods,
they are not only things it is rational for anyone to want but also
things it is rational for anyone to value particularly highly relative
to other primary social goods.
It is not claimed that these liberties are always to be valued more
highly than any other goods. Rawls allows that under particularly
dire conditions, when bare survival or the pursuit of the means for a
minimally comfortable life is the dominant concern, and when the
necessary prerequisites for the effective exercise of the basic liberties
are lacking, it may be rational to sacrifice basic liberties for the sake
of other goods such as increased security or economic development.
It is under such conditions that the General Conception of Justice as
Fairness applies. Rawls argues,36 however, that as conditions improve
and the possibility for the effective exercise of the basic liberties be-
comes real, people will set an increasingly high marginal value on
basic liberties relative to other goods. After the most urgent wants
are satisfied, people come to set greater importance on the liberty
to determine and pursue their own plans of life. They will therefore
insist on the right to pursue their own spiritual and cultural interests,
seek to "secure the free internal life of the various communities of
interests in which persons and groups seek to achieve . . . the ends
and excellences to which they are drawn" and, in addition, "come to
aspire to some control over the laws and rules that regulate their
association, either by directly taking part themselves in its affairs or
indirectly through representatives with whom they are affiliated by
ties of culture and social situation.13 7 Recognizing these tendencies, the
parties in the Original Position will see that "[b]eyond some point it
becomes and then remains irrational [for them] . . . to acknowledge
a lesser liberty for the sake of greater material means and amenities.
*..,,38 Thus the position of liberty under the Special Conception makes
explicit the priority that emerges under the General Conception as
the natural preference for basic liberties over increases in other
primary social goods asserts itself.
There are a number of questions one might raise concerning this
argument. First, since the appeal to an increasing preference for
36 RAws § 82.
37M. 543.
38 Id. 542.
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basic liberties over other primary social goods represents Rawls'
most detailed claim about the way in which the parties in the
Original Position would order bundles of primary social goods, it
naturally gives rise to questions of the sort considered above under
the heading of "parameters." Rather than to consider the general
question of whether this preference is in some suitable sense "uni-
versal," however, it seems to me more profitable to ask whether an
appeal to such a preference provides adequate and interesting answers
to those questions about liberty (and about the particular basic
liberties listed by Rawls) that one would want a philosophical theory
of liberty to answer.
Foremost among these is the question to what extent the basic
liberties have some kind of absolute status and to what extent, and
within what limits, they are to be understood and interpreted in
terms of a balancing of competing interests. Raws appears to have
two answers to this question. The first, given by the Priority Rule,
makes the limitation on acceptable balancing depend upon the dis-
tinction between basic liberties and other primary social goods: basic
liberties are to be limited only for the sake of the -total system of
basic liberty itself. The second answer, and the one most often used
by Rawls to indicate when a lesser but still equal liberty is just, is
given by what he calls the Principle of the Common Interest:
According to this principle institutions are ranked by how
effectively they guarantee the conditions necessary for all
equally to further their aims, or by how efficiently they
advance shared ends that will similarly benefit everyone.
Thus reasonable regulations to maintain public order and
security, or efficient measures for public health and safety,
promote the common interest in this sense. So do collective
efforts for national defense in a just war.39
Rawls does not formulate this principle explicitly, but his discussion °
suggests the following formulation: basic liberties may be restricted
only when methods of reasoning acceptable to all make it clear that
unrestricted liberties will lead to consequences generally agreed to be
harmful for all.
Rawls seems to hold4 that these two doctrines are consistent, i.e.
that cases in which a restriction of basic liberties is justified by the
Principle of the Common Interest are also cases in which basic liberty
is being limited for the sake of the total system of basic liberty itself.
39 Id. 97.
40 Id. 213-14.
4
1Id. 246-47, 212-13,
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This appears to be true in the most apocalyptic cases, e.g. cases in
which a restriction of basic liberties is necessary as part of the common
defense against an invasion. It may be true as well in some more
mundane cases, such as Rawls' example of the restrictions imposed
upon the right to speak by fair rules of order (taking into account, as
was noted above, that what is protected in this case is not, strictly
speaking, liberty but rather the worth of liberty). But if the re-
strictions on utterances imposed by such a set of rules count as
restrictions on a basic liberty, then so also must similar restrictions on
the time, place and manner of political demonstrations, religious
festivals, parades, the placing of posters and the use of loudspeakers
and sound trucks. Regulation of these activities is normally thought
to be acceptable, and appears to be justified by something like the
Principle of the Common Interest, but it seems to me difficult to
maintain (without considerable stretching of the notion of a basic
liberty) that in these cases basic liberties are being restricted only for
the sake of the same or other basic liberties. It seems to me much
more plausible and straightforward to say that in order to arrive at a
policy in these cases we must balance the value of certain modes
of exercise of a basic liberty not only against the exercise of other
basic liberties but also against the enjoyment of other goods (unin-
terrupted sleep, undefaced public buildings, etc.). Something like this
is surely true in the case of the restriction of expression by laws
against defamation: different standards of defamation for, on the one
hand, private, artistic or cultural expression and, on the other, political
debate, seem to me obviously appropriate, and I take this to be the
reflection of the differing values we place on the unfettered exercise
of these forms of expression relative to, among other things, the value
placed on safeguarding the primary good of self-respect.
One could of course maintain that what is balanced against
liberty in these cases is not liberty itself but the worth of liberty.
Since almost anything, including any significant increase or decrease
in material well-being, can affect the worth of liberty, the general
principle that basic liberties may be restricted only when this brings
an increase (or is necessary to avoid a decrease) in the worth of the
total system of basic liberties appears to be a weaker principle than
Rawls wishes to defend. I suggest that Rawls' response here would
be that while a great number of things can contribute to the worth of
liberty, not every restriction of basic liberty that yields gains in other
goods will yield sufficient gains to constitute a net increase in the worth
of the total system of such liberties. This is what a restriction must
do in order to be acceptable.
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Conceivably, this principle can be made to fit the most obvious
cases in which a restriction of basic liberty is justified. Given the
rather diffuse character of the notion of "the worth of the total
system of basic liberties," however, it is not a principle that is easy to
apply. Under any account the decision as to when a restriction on basic
liberty is justified will involve some difficult balancing, but I do not
think that a clear guideline between acceptable and unacceptable
balancing is obtained by describing everything in terms of "the worth
of liberty." Such an approach might seem inviting if one thought that
the notion of an increasing preference for basic liberties over other
goods represented the most important theoretical element in the case
for liberty. But I do not think that this is so. On the contrary it
seems to me that the idea of an increasing preference for basic
liberties leaves out or obscures the most important factors in the case
for certain of the basic liberties, factors which Rawls' own discussion
of these particular basic liberties brings out quite clearly.
2. Freedom of the Person
The argument from an increasing marginal preference for liberties
over other primary goods is most appropriate as an account of the
basis of freedom of the person. It is not completely clear from
Rawls' discussion what this category of basic liberties is to encompass
other than the protections against arrest and seizure embodied under
"the rule of law," but I take it to include at least freedom of move-
ment within the country and across its borders, freedom of choice
in aspects of one's personal life, and perhaps also freedom from
surveillance. The increasing preference for these liberties claimed
by Rawls can be seen as deriving in part from the fact that they
represent important conditions for the use and enjoyment of other
goods. Beyond this, however, there is the fact that the interventions
these liberties are intended to preclude constitute particularly deep
intrusions into a person's life which anyone has strong reasons to
want to avoid, both because of the real disruption they cause and
because of their great symbolic impact.
We can of course imagine people who felt quite differently about
these matters. To the extent that such differences are not merely
the object of speculative imagination but the subject of real dis-
agreement and controversy, the force of Rawls' argument for the
priority of freedom of the person will be seriously weakened. But
in such an event it seems clear that the case for these liberties will be
genuinely in doubt. Rawls' analysis of the case for the freedoms of
the person as a matter of relative preference thus seems quite appro-
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priate; there is no obvious theoretical element in the case for these
liberties that his analysis leaves out.
3. Liberties of Expression, Thought
and Conscience
Freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and free-
dom of thought present a slightly different case. The argument for the
priority of these liberties rests upon the recognition by the parties in
the Original Position that as material conditions improve there will be
a "growing insistence upon the right to pursue our spiritual and
cultural interests."' As Rawls says in arguing for freedom of con-
science, the parties "must assume that they may have moral, religious,
or philosophical interests which they cannot put in jeopardy unless
there is no alternative.;
43
Now this argument contains two distinguishable elements. The
first is the recognition by the parties in the Original Position that,
for the reasons discussed in connection with the argument against per-
fectionism, they cannot concede to the government any authority in
matters of religious, moral or philosophic doctrine. As Rawls says,
The government has no authority to render religious asso-
ciations either legitimate or illegitimate any more than it has
this authority in regard to art and science. These matters are
simply not within its competence as defined by a just con-
stitution. Rather, given the principles of justice, the state
must be understood as the association consisting of equal
citizens. It does not concern itself with philosophical and
religious doctrine but regulates individuals' pursuit of their
moral and spiritual interests in accordance with principles
to which they themselves would agree in an initial situation
of equality.44
The second element is the recognition by the parties that they will
come to set a particularly high value on the pursuit of their "spiritual
and cultural interests."
These two elements are clearly independent. To take the case of
religion, the value that a group of people place on keeping their
religious commitments will be reflected in such things as the amount
of economic loss and disruption of the pattern of life they are willing
to undergo to allow everyone to observe the holidays of his religion,
attend services, etc. and in the lengths to which they are prepared
42 Id. 543.
431d. 206.
44 Id.212.
1042 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:1020
to go to recognize and respect the religious scruples of individual mem-
bers against taking part in certain necessary tasks and activities. It is
certainly possible that the cost a society is willing to bear in order
to allow full freedom of religious observance might vary widely while
the principle of the lack of governmental authority to decide between
particular religious doctrines remained quite fixed.
This kind of variation in the value attached to religious obser-
vance, while possible, may in fact be unlikely if, as Rawls says, "[a] n
individual recognizing religious and moral obligations regards them
as binding absolutely in the sense that he cannot qualify his fulfill-
ment of them for the sake of greater means for promoting his other
interests."" This extraordinary importance attached to religious
matters tends to overshadow the distinction I have tried to draw and
makes it inviting to rest the case for toleration entirely on the claim
that the parties in the Original Position can foresee that they will
come to set an incomparably higher value on religious liberty (i.e. on
the freedom to meet their religious commitments) than on other
primary social goods. But this approach becomes less attractive if we
think not only of religious liberty but of freedom of thought and
expression more broadly construed. A society is apt to set rather
different values on the fulfillment of religious commitments, the
pursuit of scientific knowledge and the pursuit and enjoyment of
excellence in the arts, and these differences will be reflected in the
price the society is willing to bear in order to allow these activities to
go forward. But in a society which recognizes freedom of thought and
expression the regulation of these pursuits will be guided by a common
principle that governments lack the authority to decide matters of
moral, religious or philosophic doctrine (or of scientific truth) and
hence also lack the authority to restrict certain activities on the
grounds that they promulgate false or corrupting doctrines. Let me
call this principle, which I have formulated only very crudely, the
Principle of Limited Authority.
Taken alone such a principle does not constitute a complete
doctrine of liberty or even of freedom of thought and expression. But
it seems to me that this principle is the most important element in
such a doctrine that can be established from the point of view of the
Original Position. It is not possible to determine from that standpoint
exactly what relative values are to be assigned to these pursuits and
to other interests with which they may conflict. Nor is it possible to
foresee from that standpoint what will be the best way of regulating
4 5 Id. 207.
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these pursuits so that they do not conflict. These are problems that
can be dealt with only at a later stage when the full facts about a
society and the preferences of its members are known. (I suspect that
this process of balancing and coordination is what Rawls has in mind
when he speaks of restricting particular basic liberties in order to
strengthen the total system of basic liberties.) While it may be possible
for the parties in the Original Position to foresee that in general they
will attach a high value to their spiritual and cultural interests, such a
general preference, or a resultant general principle that in the
balancing process these liberties are to take precedence over other
goods, seems to me to be less useful as the basis for a doctrine of
freedom of thought and expression than the idea that the process of
balancing must take place within the constraints imposed by some-
thing like the Principle of Limited Authority.
A doctrine of freedom of expression founded on this idea is
suggested by Rawls on a number of occasions, in particular in his
principle of the common interest, with its emphasis on the distinction
between what might be called "neutral" and "non-neutral" grounds
for restricting liberty. I think that some account of freedom of ex-
pression of this general type must be correct, although there are a
number of difficulties in formulating such a view. 6 While I have some
misgivings about Rawls' particular formulation (misgivings, e.g., as
to whether too much may be conceded to the doctrine of clear and
present danger by his blanket allowance that liberty of conscience
may be limited "when there is a reasonable expectation that not
doing so will damage the public order which the government should
maintain"4 7), it seems to me one of the strong points of Rawls' theory
(as described in the first part of this section) that it provides a
philosophical basis for an account of liberty of this type. It therefore
seems to me important to ask whether this strength is adequately
represented in his doctrine of the priority of liberty.
While it is not explicitly stated in the Priority Rule, the Principle
of Limited Authority will be implied by clause (b) of that rule if (as
seems plausible on the basis of the argument of the preceding section)
we take governmental authority over matters of religion, etc. to
represent an unequal liberty which would not be acceptable to those
whose liberty is restricted. It is unclear, however, how this principle is
related to the argument for the priority rule based on the increasing
46 1 have myself put forward a view of this kind in Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom
of Expression, 1 Pm.. & PuB. ArAms 204 (1972).
4 7 RAWaS 213.
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marginal value of liberty. There seem to be two possible interpreta-
tions of this argument.
While the parties in the Original Position might readily agree
that there are conditions under which the pursuit of spiritual and
cultural interests may be severely curtailed for the sake of other more
pressing needs, it may seem unlikely, given the close relation between
the Principle of Limited Authority and the conception of individual
autonomy underlying the argument against perfectionism, that the
parties would ever concede to a government the right to decide matters
of moral, religious or philosophic doctrine. This suggests an inter-
pretation of Rawls' argument according to which the Principle of
Limited Authority applies under the General Conception of Justice as
Fairness as well as under the Special Conception. What distinguishes
the Special Conception, on this view, is just the increased importance
that is attached to spiritual and cultural interests as the opportunity
to pursue these interests presents itself and the demands of mere
survival become less pressing. This interpretation is faithful to
Rawls' description of the transition from the General Conception to
the Special Conception as consisting of a shift in the ordering of
primary social goods. But the Principle of Limited Authority is not
a factor in this shift; it stands instead as a constant element of the
theory. Given the importance of this principle from Rawls' point of
view, it seems somewhat surprising on this interpretation that nothing
resembling this principle is either stated or implied in Rawls' account
of the General Conception.
An alternative, somewhat more extreme interpretation, and one
which seems to me more likely to represent Rawls' view, would identify
the Principle of Limited Authority as one of the distinguishing ele-
ments of the Special Conception. This means that there must be
circumstances to which the General Conception of Justice as Fairness
applies but in which the parties in the Original Position would not
only allow the severe curtailment of expression on the grounds
allowed under the Principle of the Common Interest but would also
suspend the Principle of Limited Authority itself. I am not quite
certain what such situations would be like. Presumably they would be
situations in which cooperation on certain common tasks is not
merely mutually advantageous but essential for survival or for the
amelioration of intolerable conditions. If deep disagreements were to
exist which made the basis of this cooperation fragile, and if close
and uninterrupted cooperation were required to avoid consequences
that would be disastrous for all, then perhaps it would be rational not
only to accept rigid regulation on the time, place and manner of ex-
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pression to prevent interference with essential work, but also to grant
to the government the power to ban the expression of views likely
to give rise to dangerous controversy or to dissention and doubt.
It seems to me most accurate to describe such situations as ones
in which the circumstances of justice would be present only to a
limited degree. Cooperation in certain tasks may be feasible and
profitable and in these areas of common purpose considerations of
justice may apply, dictating, e.g., that the benefits and burdens of this
cooperation (including liberties and constraints) should be shared in
accordance with Rawls' Second Principle of Justice. But if the basis
of this cooperation is quite shaky, and if the ends at which it aims are
truly vital, then it might be rational for the parties involved to regard
each other primarily as means to these ends. This attitude would be
reflected, for example, in the parties' placing the smooth functioning
of their institutions ahead of the right of individual members to raise
and discuss with each other questions about the wisdom, viability or
propriety of these institutions. I have some inclination to say that
such a case would not represent cooperation on a footing of justice at
all; collective actions to quell controversy in such circumstances are
best seen not as the exercise of the distinctive authority of a just
government in the sense defined by the Original Position, but rather
as acts which must be justified on a case-by-case basis by appeal to
the residual rights of the individuals involved to undertake those
measures necessary to their self-defense and survival.4s
However this may be, it is at least clear that the justification I
have offered for limited tolerance in what might be called situations
of partial justice depends upon the presence of conditions under which
anything which undermines effective cooperation represents an imme-
diate threat to all. When these conditions are lacking, such justifica-
tion is also lacking, and, in addition, it becomes rational for people
to seek to establish cooperation on a footing that gives full recognition
to the status of the participants as autonomous equals, i.e. to some-
thing like Rawls' Special Conception.
One thing making this transition rational is the fact that under
improving conditions individuals will develop religious, moral and
philosophical interests and will want their institutions to safeguard
their pursuit of these interests. But on the interpretation I have been
discussing the Special Conception of Justice as Fairness can no longer
be seen simply as what emerges under the General Conception once
these interests begin to develop. For the transition to the Special
4 8 Such a view is suggested in Scanlon, supra note 46, at 224-26.
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Conception involves a fundamental change in the basis of cooperation,
namely a move to what I called in the first part of this section
cooperation on a footing of justice. Cooperation on this basis would
be less apt to be rational for people if they did not place a high value
on certain kinds of opportunity, but the defining elements of this form
of cooperation go beyond this configuration of preferences, just as the
defining elements of just cooperation in the economic sphere go beyond
the structure of needs and interests that make such cooperation in-
viting.
III. CONTRA UTILITARIANISM
A dominant place in twentieth-century Anglo-American moral
philosophy and, even more, in the normative thinking of American
legal and social theorists, has been occupied by the family of theories
called utilitarianism. Like the theories which, following Rawls, I have
called perfectionist, these theories have a teleological structure. That
is, they set out to define notions of right (the moral permissibility and
impermissibility of actions, the justice or moral acceptability of social
institutions) solely in terms of tendencies to promote certain specified
ends (understood independently of considerations of right). In the
case of classical utilitarianism as espoused by Bentham49 this means
that an action is held to be right (i.e. permissible) if and only if there is
no alternative action available to the agent at the time which would
yield greater net balance of pleasure over pain (or, alternatively,
greater total happiness). Social institutions and pieces of legislation
are to be judged similarly in terms of their tendency to promote this
end. In determining the moral status of a course of action or an
institution we are to take into account the happiness of every person
affected, giving each equal weight.
It is useful to divide teleological theories into two groups on the
basis of the end which they call upon us to promote. What I will call
hard teleological theories are those which define notions of right in
terms of the tendency to bring about certain states of affairs which
are not states of consciousness in individuals and which are held to be
valuable quite independently of their tendency to bring enjoyment,
pleasure or satisfaction to individuals. Soft teleological theories, on the
other hand, are those which take as the end to be promoted some
state or states of consciousness of individuals, e.g. pleasurable sensa-
tions of some kind.
4 9
See J. BENTIIAM, INTRODUCTION TO m PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
ch. 1 (1907).
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Hard teleological theories (some or all of which are what Rawls
calls perfectionist theories-I am not certain how broadly he intends
this term to apply) leave open the possibility that an overall net
sacrifice in the quality of the lives of all persons now and in the
future could be justified if this were required for promotion of the
specified goal. Thus, soft teleological theories, of which utilitarianism
is the principal example, put themselves forward as a humanistic
alternative. If the states of consciousness on which a utilitarian theory
is based are ones which all human beings are capable (in roughly
equal degrees) of experiencing, then that theory also has a democratic
cast by comparison with perfectionist theories, in which all weight is
given to the promotion of accomplishments of which only a few per-
sons may be capable. Under utilitarianism everyone counts and is
counted equally. This does not at once mean that everyone is to be
treated equally, however, for distributive considerations per se are
irrelevant in the utilitarian scheme, and it is quite conceivable that
two quite different distributions of material goods might yield the
same total of satisfactions and thus have equal claim to be promoted
on utilitarian grounds. Natural empirical assumptions about the way
in which satisfaction is in fact produced suggest, however, that
equality of material circumstances has a special claim to the utilitarian's
attention. The principal empirical assumption here is what is generally
called the principle of diminishing marginal utility: the principle that
each successive increment of a good produces a smaller increase in
satisfaction than the preceding (equal) increment. If this is true for
all of us and for all goods (hence generally for increments of real
income), and if different persons' utility functions (i.e. the curve re-
lating amounts of goods to satisfaction produced) are roughly similar,
then every step away from equality of real income will be disad-
vantageous from a utilitarian point of view: the loss in satisfaction of
the persons who receive a less than equal share .will be greater than
the gain in satisfaction for those whose real income is increased.
A parallel empirical argument provides a prima facie case for a
kind of libertarianism on utilitarian grounds. If each person is the
best judge of his own satisfactions, and if each person is naturally
motivated to choose those alternatives which promise him greater
satisfaction, then there is reason to think it good utilitarian policy to
leave every person alone in those actions that concern primarily himself
and affect others scarcely at all. It is worth pointing out that the
motivational assumption made here must be plausible if the utilitarian
theory itself is to be plausible. The main intuitive argument for the
theory rests on the claim that what I have been calling satisfaction
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represents for each person what is desirable in any event or course of
action; the moral point of view, it is then claimed, just requires of us
that we care equally about everyone else's fate in just the way we care
about our own, i.e. that we seek to maximize the total of their (and
our) satisfactions, counting each for one and none for more than one.
To a much greater degree than the other alternative views so
far considered, utilitarianism can be formulated and given a plausible
defense within Rawls' Original Position construction. Although I have
so far been considering the classical version of utilitarianism in which
it is the total of satisfactions that is to be maximized, it will be ad-
vantageous to focus on the arguments which can be offered in the
Original Position for and against the principle of average utility, the
principle which holds those social institutions to be morally preferable
under which the average level of satisfactions is maximized.
What the proponent of the principle of average utility claims,
according to Rawls,"0 is that each party in the Original Position should
reason as follows:
The worth to me of a given allotment of material goods and
social opportunities (i.e. the satisfaction that allotment will
bring me) will depend upon my tastes, desires and abilities.
All I can say without knowledge of these is that I want to
have that combination of, on the one hand, social goods and,
on the other hand, tastes and abilities which will yield me the
greatest level of satisfaction. In the absence of any in-
formation about my position in society or my tastes and
abilities it is rational for me to assume that if I am a member
of a particular society, the probability of my being a person
in a certain social position is represented by the proportion
of the total population who are in that position. Similarly,
knowing nothing of my particular interests and talents, it is
rational for me to suppose that the probability that I, if I am
a person in a certain social position in a given society, will
have or develop certain interests and talents is represented
by the proportion of the people in that position in the society
who have those interests and talents. It follows that the ex-
pected value for me of being some person (I know not which
one) in a given society is represented by the average of the
levels of satisfaction enjoyed by people in that society.
Consequently, it is rational for me to choose as the funda-
mental principle by which the basic structure of my society
is to be judged the principle that material goods and oppor-
tunities are to be distributed in such a way that the average
level of satisfaction is maximized.
Rawls offers a number of arguments in support of his claim that
50o RALs 163-66.
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his own Two Principles (with the Second Principle interpreted by what
he calls the Difference Principle) would be chosen over the principle
of average utility by the parties in the Original Position. The argument
which has received widest attention is based upon an appeal, to what
is known as the maximin criterion for rational choice under uncer-
tainty. A "choice under uncertainty" in the technical sense in which
this phrase is used in decision theory is a choice between alternatives
some of which may produce a number of different outcomes depend-
ing upon circumstances which are beyond the chooser's control and to
which he has no positive grounds for assigning probabilities. The
maximin criterion specifies that in such a situation one should
"maximize the minimum," i.e. seek to insure oneself the highest
obtainable minimum by choosing that alternative whose worst outcome
is at least as good as the worst outcome of any other alternative.
Applied to the problem of the Original Position this means that the
parties' main concern should be to maximize the expectations of the
members of the worst-off class in their society. This leads them to
choose as a principle of distributive justice what Rawls calls the
Difference Principle.
The maximin criterion is an extremely conservative principle of
choice. Faced with a choice between two alternatives, the first of
which will yield us either one dollar or $100 depending on circum-
stances the relative likelihood of which we cannot determine, and
the second of which will guarantee us two dollars in either case, the
maximin criterion bids us choose the latter alternative. Rawls argues"'
that even though the maximin criterion may be too conservative to
commend itself for general adoption, nonetheless the circumstances of
the particular choice faced by the parties in the Original Position are
such as to make a conservative principle of choice appropriate for
anyone in that situation (and appropriate on objective grounds quite
independent of subjective factors such as one's taste for gambling).
These circumstances are, first, the fact that the principles chosen in
the Original Position will determine the basic features of the society
in which the parties live. What is at stake here is not one choice
among many of approximately equal import but a choice of more
fundamental importance than any other, one whose consequences are
not likely to be erased or modified by subsequent choices or circum-
stances. In addition, given the assumption that prevailing conditions
are ones which make social cooperation possible (we are not talking
of two castaways fighting over one plank) it is presumably possible
51 Id. 28.
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in the society to which the parties belong to assure everyone of
tolerable conditions of life. If this is so, then the parties to the
Original Position, while they naturally have an interest in improving
their condition above whatever level can be guaranteed for all, should
rationally be more concerned to insure that they do not have to accept
conditions below this level, which could be entirely unbearable.
Like the argument for the principle of average utility, this argu-
ment addresses itself to the interest which the parties to the Original
Position have in doing as well for themselves in society as they can.
Both arguments are thus examples of the reductive strategy which
Rawls mentions as one of the primary strategies of the Original Position
construction: to reduce the problem of determining principles of
justice to a problem of individual prudential choice under uncertainty,
a type of problem which has been extensively studied and one about
which we may hope to have a clearer view. Rawls advances other
arguments for the choice of his Two Principles, including arguments
which appeal to other aims of the parties, e.g. their aims to select
principles which it will be possible for them to uphold in the condi-
tions of their actual society, to select principles which will support a
stable social order, and to select principles which will express their
nature as rational beings and provide a secure foundation for their
self-respect. I will discuss some of these arguments in the following
section. In the remainder of this section I want to consider in more
detail the contrast between Rawls' principles and various forms of
utilitarianism.
It is absolutely crucial to the argument presented above for the
principle of average utility that a subjective quantity such as satis-
faction rather than, say, primary social goods or some other objective
index of real income be taken as the measure of relative well-being.
As an alternative to be considered in the Original Position, a principle
requiring the maximization of the average share of primary social
goods would totally lack plausibility; for, since there will be wildly
different distributions of such goods which yield the same average,
the adoption of such a principle would represent an extreme form of
gambling. Against the choice of this principle Rawls' argument for
the rationality of conservatism in the choice of basic institutions seems
exactly right. But the effect of the standard empirical assumptions
(i.e. diminishing marginal utility) about how satisfaction is produced
by material goods and opportunities is greatly to narrow the range of
possible variation among those distributions of primary social goods
which yield the same average level of satisfaction. Since these assump-
tions have quite a bit of intuitive plausibility for most people (perhaps
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as much as the maximin criterion itself) this considerably undermines
the force of Rawls' argument. This reliance on the special properties
of satisfaction, however, exposes the utilitarian to another line of
attack, one directed against the notion of satisfaction itself.
In accordance with the reductive strategy I have mentioned, what
is appealed to in the argument for the principle of average utility is
not what might be called the ethical role of the notion of satisfaction,
but rather its psychological role in the motivation and explanation of
the rational choices of a single self-interested individual. Here satis-
faction (or in other formulations, happiness or pleasure) is supposed
to represent that thing for the sake of which all other things are
desired, and, since other things are desirable in proportion to the
satisfaction etc. they yield, satisfaction serves as a common denomi-
nator which makes possible rational choice between apparently dis-
parate alternatives (a day at the races, a night at the opera, an
afternoon in bed). Rawls argues at some length that neither satis-
faction nor happiness nor pleasure nor any other psychological
quantity is a plausible candidate for the role of "dominant end," i.e.
that thing for the sake of which all other things are to be desired. We
do often speak of some things bringing us more satisfaction than others
(or more pleasure or happiness) and of some courses of action turning
out not to bring us satisfaction, but, Rawls argues, this should not
be taken as a reference to some psychological quantity which under-
lies all our choices; rather, it is just another way of saying that
certain things are to be preferred or that others do not, after all,
seem to be preferable and that we are inclined to look for some alter-
native. Rawls also argues that there is no necessity to posit a dominant
end in order to give an account of rational choice between disparate
alternatives. It is simply a fact that we can make such choices
without the aid of some psychological common standard. Rawls gives
his own account of how some choices of this kind are possible, an
account which I have briefly sketched in my discussion of the good for
a person." On Rawls' analysis, one method we may employ in
choosing between disparate alternatives is to ask ourselves whether
they do in fact answer to some of the same ends and, to the extent
that this is so, which is preferable on these grounds. But this is not
the whole process of rational choice; there are many other methods.
Although I find Rawls' arguments on these points entirely com-
pelling and will suppose them to be correct in the discussion which
follows, I cannot rehearse them in detail here. It should be noted,
52 See Section IIA supra.
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however, that Rawls' attack on the idea of a dominant end (satis-
faction, pleasure or happiness) which is to be maximized in all rational
self-interested choices is not an attack on the notion of utility as it is
used in modern decision theory. In this theory (as to a large extent in
Rawls' own account of rational choice) it is the notion of preference
which is taken as primary. Decision theory uses the notion of a utility
function to describe and systematize a person's preferences, but
makes no claim to having explained those preferences by isolating
that thing for the sake of which the preferred alternatives are to be
preferred.
The idea that satisfaction represents that thing for the sake of
which all other things are to be chosen is invoked in a particularly
strong form in the argument for the principle of average utility. In this
argument the particular tastes, desires, talents and abilities which are
developed and exercised in a life, the choices which determine that
life and the circumstances in which it is lived are all treated as quite
incidental and secondary to the fundamental question of how much
satisfaction the life promises to the person who lives it. The utilitarian
chooser in the Original Position takes no facts about himself into
account in making his choice of principles; he appraises alternatives
not from the point of view of a person who will have some (at present
unknown) system of ends, but from the point of view of a subject
who will enjoy one quantity or another of satisfaction.
Now it may be said here that a person in the Original Position is
prevented by the veil of ignorance from taking any facts about himself
into account in making his choice of principles and therefore that the
oddity I am objecting to is due to the idea of choice behind a veil of
ignorance and not to utilitarianism. But there is more than one way
of dealing with the lack of knowledge which those in the Original
Position suffer. One possibility, the one just described, is to take the
view that even if one does not know what one's ends and abilities are,
the one thing one does know is that greater satisfaction is to be
preferred to less, and this provides a way of ranking alternative lives
which is neutral with respect to differences in tastes and abilities.
Another possibility, however, is to consider those material goods and
opportunities (the primary social goods) which, whether because they
are necessary as means or for other reasons, are to be desired no
matter what one's ends are. The latter alternative gives a priority to
the choosing self which is lacking under the former. It represents the
attitude: "Although I don't know what ends I, as a member of
society, have, I know that my fundamental overall aim is to work out
and pursue these ends. My purpose in choosing a conception of justice
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should be to secure the best conditions for me to pursue this aim."
The fundamental aim referred to here, while it might be said to
represent the overall objective of a human life, is not a dominant
end in the sense in which satisfaction claims to be; it is not that thing
for which all other things-candy, foie gras and record albums-are
chosen.
What I have here called the priority of the choosing self is of
course the same notion on which the argument against perfectionism
was found to hinge. This reflects the fact that the distinction between
hard and soft teleological views is less deep than it at first appears.
The aim of the move from hard to soft teleology was just to give a
more fundamental place in ethical theory to each individual person.
But once the notion of utility (satisfaction, pleasure, happiness, etc.)
is identified with any particular complex of psychological states the
activity of the rational self is again reduced to the status of a means
to the production of these states. As Rawls says,
The parties [to the Original Position] regard moral per-
sonality and not the capacity for pleasure and pain as the
fundamental aspect of the self. They do not know what final
aims persons have, and all dominant-end conceptions are
rejected. Thus it would not occur to them to acknowledge the
principle of utility in its hedonistic form. There is no more
reason for the parties to agree to this criterion than to
maximize any other particular objective. 3
Just as the principle of utility as a criterion for first-person
prudential choice leads a person to see his talents, ends and desires as
means to the production of satisfaction, so, as an ethical principle,
it requires a person to take the view that his life and activities have
a claim on others for support and noninterference based solely on and
strictly proportional to the amount of satisfaction they produce. Each
person is to look at others (and himself) as so many lines along which
resources may be allocated, the overall aim being to produce the
greatest total (or average) satisfaction.
A utilitarian might respond that this outlook is not so im-
plausible as I have tried to make it sound, and he might add that the
rejection of this outlook is largely self-serving. "We all should admit,"
he might say, "that our more frivolous pursuits should not be provided
for at the expense of enough food for others. Moreover, when we
consider the natural explanation for this fact (based on the principle
of diminishing marginal utility) we will see that it rests on an outlook
strikingly similar to the one you have just caricatured."
53 RAwLs 563.
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But we must distinguish here between the intuitive judgment that
more basic needs have a stronger claim to attention than less basic
ones and the utilitarian explanation which finds the reason for this
judgment in the fact that greater satisfaction is produced by ful-
filling the former than by fulfilling the latter. Such an explanation is
no more plausible here than in the case of prudential choice by a
single individual: I believe that it is more important for me to have
enough to eat than to have a new electric typewriter, but this fact is
not to be explained by claiming that the former produces for me a
greater quantity of that same thing (satisfaction) that makes the latter
desirable. (In fact the claim that we choose between alernatives by
comparing the amounts of satisfaction they offer seems to have its
greatest plausibility when we are dealing with needs or wants of
approximately equal urgency; it lacks appeal where the utilitarian
needs it most: in the comparison of more basic needs with more
frivolous ones.)
Now a utilitarian might respond at this point (if he has not done
so earlier) that it is unfair to attack utilitarianism by attacking its
hedonistic variant. Once we admit, as moral common ground, the
idea that greater priority is to be attached to the fulfillment of some
needs than to the fulfillment of others, how can we first assume that
the utilitarian must go beyond this idea to an explanation in terms of
a supposed psychological quantity, and then criticize him for doing
this? Once a hierarchy of needs is admitted the utilitarian can base
his theory directly on this hierarchy. Indeed, Rawls himself appeals
to such a hierarchy in defending the use of the maximin rule in the
Original Position when he points out that the parties should be more
concerned with making sure that they do not fall below the level of
well-being that can be guaranteed for all than with attempting to
advance themselves above this level.
The modified utilitarian theory I have in mind here would be
based on a hierarchy of levels of well-being measured in terms of
some neutral standard such as Rawls' primary social goods. The goal
of the theory (the standard by which acts and institutions are to be
appraised) is to move as many people as high up in this ranking as
possible, with the greatest importance to be set on increasing (and
on not decreasing) the well-being of those who at a given time enjoy
the lowest standard of well-being. The intuitive justification for this
theory is just a depsychologized version of the intuitive argument for
utilitarianism: each person attaches a positive value to increases in
his own well-being (as measured by the standard in question), and a
principle of decreasing marginal strength of preference applies here,
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i.e. he attaches less importance to the difference between two positions
"higher up" in the hierarchy of levels of well-being than to a quan-
titatively similar difference between positions "lower down" in the
hierarchy. What the theory asks is that we take this same attitude
towards the well-being of each person.
Now in order to apply this theory we must have some method for
making decisions when faced with a choice between different com-
plexes of gains to some people and losses to others. There is a problem
here in specifying the terms in which the relevant comparisons are to
be made without either introducing explicitly moral notions or else
falling back on some psychological quantity, but the crucial point for
the theory arises in determining how the choices are to be made on
the basis of these comparisons, specifically how the bias in favor
of helping (and not hurting) those who are less well off is to be
expressed.
One alternative is to stick with the idea that while, in general,
more basic needs are to take priority over less basic ones, nonetheless
it is in principle possible that sufficiently large gains to enough people
even at quite a high level of well-being could justify losses by a few
people whose level of well-being is relatively low. On this alternative
the basic teleological structure of utilitarianism is preserved-gains
really are being balanced against losses-although it may be difficult
or impossible to specify in substantive terms what it is that is being
"maximized." A person who took this alternative might, in historic
utilitarian fashion, maintain it as a rule of thumb (not a theoretical
principle but a practical guide rarely to be broken) that the interests
of those at lower levels of well-being should never be sacrificed for
the benefit of those at higher levels.
A second alternative would be to make an initial theoretical deci-
sion based on the observation that more basic needs are not to be
sacrificed to less basic ones and to maintain from the outset a rule
against taking the gains of some as justification for the losses of others
who are at a lower level of well-being. On this view it becomes un-
necessary to compare in each case the gains of some with the losses
of others, and we no longer have a theory which can be construed as
calling upon us to maximize the sum (or average) over the population
of any quantity at all. What we have instead is a theory directing that
all decisions be made with the aim of increasing the well-being of
those currently worst off. Thus, this apparently more dogmatic alterna-
tive brings us close to Rawls' Difference Principle. Moreover, if we
take as a crucial step in Rawls' argument his appeal (mentioned above)
to the asymmetry of the attitudes of the parties in the Original Position
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to gains above the level of well-being that can be guaranteed to all and
losses below this level, then the case he offers comes close to the form
sketched at the beginning of this paragraph. Despite these similarities,
however, there are significant differences between Raws' position and
the modified "utilitarian" position just described. I will discuss these
differences more fully in the following section.
IV. DIsTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND THE DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE
Rawls is concerned with justice in only one of the many senses of
the term. For him, questions of justice are questions of how the benefits
and burdens of social cooperation are to be shared, and the principles
of justice he develops are to apply in the first instance not to arbitrary
distributions of goods but to the basic institutions of society which
determine "the assignment of rights and duties and ...regulate the
distribution of social and economic advantages." 4 Rawls' principles
apply to particular distributions only indirectly: a distribution may be
called just if it is the result of just institutions working properly, but
the principles provide no standard for appraising the justice of dis-
tributions independent of the institutions effecting them.55 Conceived
of in this way, principles of justice are analogous to a specification of
what constitutes a fair gamble. If a gamble is fair then its outcome,
whatever it may be, is fair and cannot be complained of. But the notion
of a fair gamble provides no standard for judging particular distribu-
tions (Smith and Harris win five dollars, Jones loses ten dollars) as
fair or unfair when these are considered in isolation from particular
gambles which bring them about.
The principle which Rawls offers for appraising the distributive
aspects of the basic structure of a society is his Second Principle of
Justice which, considerations of the priority of liberty aside, is equiva-
lent to what he calls the General Conception of Justice as Fairness.
This principle is stated as follows: "Social and economic inequalities
are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit
of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open
to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity."
56
According to clause (a) of this principle, which Rawls refers to
as the Difference Principle, a system of social and economic inequalities
is just only if there is no feasible alternative institution under which
the expectations of the worst-off group would be greater. The phrase
Mrld. 61.
55 d. 88.
56Id. 83. Rawls' final formulation of this principle, id. 312, incorporates considera-
tions of justice between generations which the present discussion leaves aside.
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"fair equality of opportunity" in clause (b) requires not only that
no one be formally excluded from positions to which special benefits
attach, but also that persons with similar talents and inclinations should
have similar prospects of attaining these benefits "regardless of their
initial place in the social system, that is, irrespective of the income
class into which they are born. 7 The rationale behind this principle,
particularly the motivation for clause (a), will be discussed at length
below. First, however, I will consider briefly how the principle is to
be applied.
A. The Difference Principle and Its Application
The most natural examples of inequalities to which Rawls' prin-
ciple might be applied involve the creation of new jobs or offices to
which special economic rewards are attached or an increase in the
income associated with an existing job. But the intended application
of the principle is much broader than this. It is to apply not only to
inequalities in wealth and income but to all inequalities in primary
social goods, e.g. to the creation of positions of special political author-
ity. Further, its application is not limited to "jobs" or "offices" in the
narrow sense but includes all the most general features of the basic
structure of a society that give rise to unequal shares of primary social
goods. In the case of economic goods these will include the system of
money and credit, the laws of contract, the system of property rights
and the laws governing the exchange and inheritance of property, the
system of taxation, the institutions for the provision of public goods,
etc.
It is fairly clear how Rawls' principle is to apply to the creation
of one new office to which special rewards are attached (or to the
assignment of new rewards to one existing position) in an otherwise
egalitarian society: such an inequality is just only if those who do not
directly benefit from this inequality by occupying the office benefit
indirectly with the result that they too are better off than they were
before (and than they would be if the benefits in question were dis-
tributed in any alternative way). It is less obvious how the principle
is to apply in the more general case of complex institutions with many
separable inequality-generating features. Rawls deals with this prob-
lem by specifying that institutions are to be appraised as a whole from
the perspective of representative members of each relevant social
position. The Difference Principle requires that the total system of
inequalities be so arranged as to maximize the expectations of a repre-
sentative member of the class which the system leaves worst off.
57id. 73.
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The notions of relevant social position and the expectations of a
representative person in such a position require explanation. Relevant
social positions in Rawls' sense are those places in the basic structure
of society which correspond to the main divisions in the distribution
of primary social goods. (He mentions the role of "unskilled worker"
as constituting such a position.18) Rawls believes that the distribution
of other primary social goods will be closely enough correlated with
income and wealth that the latter can be taken as an index for identify-
ing the least advantaged group. Accordingly, he suggests that the class
of least advantaged persons may be taken to include everyone whose
income is no greater than the average income of persons in the lowest
relevant social position (or alternatively everyone with less than half
the median income and wealth in the society' 9). To compute the expec-
tations of a representative member of a given social position one takes
the average of the shares of primary social goods enjoyed by persons
in that position. Thus, while the parties in the Original Position do
not estimate the value to them of becoming a member of a given society
by taking the likelihood of their being a member of a particular social
position to be represented by the proportion of the total population
that is in that position, they do estimate the expected value (in primary
social goods) of being a member of a particular social position by
taking the likelihood that they will have any particular feature affect-
ing the distribution of primary social goods within that position to be
represented by the fraction of persons in the position who have that
feature. Rawls does not explicitly discuss his reasons for allowing
averaging within a social position when he has rejected it in the more
general case. A more extreme position eschewing averaging would re-
quire maximizing the expectations of the worst-off individual in society.
The Difference Principle occupies a position somewhere between this
extreme and the principle of maximizing the average share of primary
social goods across the society as a whole, its exact position within
this range depending on how broadly or narrowly the relevant social
positions are defined. The resort to averaging seems to some extent to
be dictated by practical considerations: a coherent and manageable
theory cannot take into account literally every position in a society. 0
In addition, the theoretical case against the use of averaging (as op-
posed to some more conservative method of choice) is weaker when we
are concerned with differences in expectation within a single social
position rather than differences between such positions. For here we
58 1d. 98.
59 Id.
6O Id.
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are not concerned with a single "gamble" with incomparably high
stakes: intraposition differences are, by definition, limited, and each
person's allotment is determined by a large number of independent
factors, many of which are of approximately equal magnitude 1
There is a further problem about the notion of expectations which
requires consideration. Rawls refers to the relevant social positions as
"starting places," i.e. as the places in society people are born into."2
Now the expectations of a person born into a family in a certain social
position can be thought of as consisting of two components. First, there
is the level of well-being he can expect to enjoy as a child. Presumably
we may identify this with his parents' allotment of primary social
goods. Second, there are his long term prospects as a member of society
in his own right. If perfect fair equality of opportunity were attained
then this latter component would not be substantially affected by the
social and economic position of one's parents. As Rawls notes, however,
such perfect equality of opportunity is unlikely, at least as long as
the family is maintained, 3 so we may suppose that in general the
second component will be heavily influenced by the first. One might
conclude that the second component can be neglected entirely, reason-
ing that the distribution of social and economic advantages will influ-
ence the long term life prospects of a representative person born into
the worst-off class mainly through its effect on the conditions in which
such a person grows up. Taking this course would have the same con-
sequences as deciding that what should be considered in applying the
Difference Principle are not the expectations of a representative person
born into the worst-off social position but the expectations of a repre-
sentative person who winds up in that position after the social mechan-
ism for assigning people to social roles has run its course.
But the principle which results from ignoring long term expecta-
tions seems to me unsatisfactory. Suppose we have a society in which
there are 100 people in the lowest social position and twenty-five people
in each of the two higher positions, and suppose it becomes known
that the basic institutions of the society could be altered so that in
later generations there would be fifty people in each of the three social
positions, with the levels of wealth, income, authority, etc. associated
with these positions remaining the same as they are now. Now it seems
to me that a person in the lowest social position in this society is apt
to be strongly in favor of this change. And such a person could plaus-
ibly support this preference by saying that the expectations of a repre-
61 Cf. id. 169-71.
102 Id. 96.
63 Id. 74, 301.
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sentative person born into his social position (in particular, the
expectations of his children) would be better if this change were made
than if it were not. This increase in expectations will not be captured
by the interpretation of the Difference Principle just suggested or by
any principle which focuses only on the levels of income, wealth, etc.
associated with various positions in society while ignoring the way in
which the population is distributed among these positions. Examples
of this kind convince me that considerations of population distribution
have to be incorporated in some way into Rawls' theory, and the most
natural way to do this seems to me to be to bring them in through the
notion of long term expectations.
But how is this to be done? The rule mentioned above that the
expectations of a representative person in a given social position are to
be determined by averaging the benefits enjoyed by persons in that
position suggests that in a society with three relevant social positions
whose average levels of income, wealth, authority, etc. can be indexed
by p1, P2 and p3, the long term prospects of a person born into the
worst-off position should be represented by alp 1 + a2p2 + aap 3, where
a,, a2 and a, are the fractions of people born into the worst-off position
who wind up in each of the three places.
But the adoption of averaging as the method for computing long
term expectations has unpleasant consequences for Rawls' theory.
To the extent that the inequalities in childhood expectations resulting
from the unequal economic and social positions of different families
are eliminated (perhaps by eliminating the institution of the family
itself), the first component in the expectations of a representative
person will become the same for everyone regardless of the social
position into which he is born, and Rawls' requirement that the expec-
tations of a representative person in the lowest social position be
maximized becomes the requirement that we maximize the second com-
ponent of these expectations, i.e. the long term expectation ajp1 + a2p2
+ aap 3. Moreover, to the extent that fair equality of opportunity is
achieved (and barring the formation of a genetic elite) the coefficients
a,, a2 and a3 in this polynomial will become the same for every repre-
sentative person regardless of social class, and the polynomial will
thus come to express the average share of primary goods enjoyed by
members of the society in question. It follows that on the interpretation
just suggested Rawls' Difference Principle will be distinct from the
principle requiring us to maximize the average share of primary social
goods only so long as the inequalities resulting from the institution
of the family persist or the fair equality of opportunity required by
clause (b) of the Second Principle is otherwise not achieved. Even if
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fair equality of opportunity is an, unattainable ideal this conclusion
seems to me unacceptable for Rawls' theory. As was pointed out
above,"4 the principle of maximum average primary social goods is
an extremely implausible one, much less plausible than the principle
of maximum average utility. I see no reason to think that this principle
would be acceptable even if perfect equality of opportunity were to
obtain.
The problem here is how to give some weight to the way in which
the population is distributed across social positions without introducing
aggregative considerations in such a way that they take over the theory
altogether (or would do so but for the "friction" introduced by imper-
fect equality of opportunity). One way of dealing with this problem
which seems to me in the spirit of Rawls' theory would be to modify
the Difference Principle to require the following:
First maximize the income, wealth, etc. of the worst-off
representative person, then seek to minimize the number of
people in his position (by moving them upwards); then pro-
ceed to do the same for the next worst-off social position,
then the next and so on, finally seeking to maximize the
benefits of those in the best-off position (as long as this does
not affect the others) .1
This seems to me a natural elaboration of what Rawls calls the Lexical
Difference Principle.00 It also has the advantage of dealing with the
problem of population distribution without introducing the summing
or averaging of benefits across relevant social positions. There are
obviously many variations on this theme as well as many altogether
different approaches.0 l7
B. The Argument for the Difference Principle
I return now to the central question of the rationale behind the
Difference Principle. The intuitive idea here is that a system of in-
04 See p. 1050 supra.
65 This solution was suggested to me by Bruce Ackerman.
06 RAw-s 83. See text accompanying note 68 infra.
67 One would be to take the position a person is "born into" to be defined not
only by the social and economic status of his family but also by his inborn talents and
liabilities, i.e. those features which will enable him to prosper in the society or prevent
him from doing so. Given this definition of the "starting places," one could employ
averaging as a method for representing the long term expectations of a representative
person born into the worst-off such place without fear that the theory would collapse
into the doctrine of maximum average primary social goods if the institution of the
family were eliminated. Modifying the Difference Principle in this way would bring
Raws closer (perhaps too close) to what he calls "the principle of redress," the prin-
ciple that the distribution of social advantages must be arranged to compensate for
undeserved inequalities such as the inequalities of birth and natural endowment, See
RAwrs 100-02.
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equalities is just only if we can say to each person in the society,
"Eliminating the advantages of those who have more than you would
not enable us to improve the lot of any or all of the people in your
position (or beneath it). Thus it is unavoidable that a certain number
of people will have expectations no greater than yours, and no unfair-
ness is involved in your being one of these people." The requirement
that we be able to say this to every member of society, and not just
to those in the worst-off group, corresponds to what Rawls calls the
Lexical Difference Principle:
[I]n a basic structure with n relevant representatives, first
maximize the welfare of the worst-off representative man;
second, for equal welfare of the worst-off representative,
maximize the welfare of the second worst-off representative
man, and so on until the last case which is, for equal welfare
of all the preceding n-1 representatives, maximize the welfare
of the best-off representative man."
This form of the principle is called "lexical" since "lexical prior-
ity" is given to the expectations of the worse-off: the fate of the
second worst-off group is considered only to decide between arrange-
ments which do equally well for the worst-off, and so on for the higher
groups, working always from the bottom up. This asymmetry of con-
cern in favor of the worse-off is a central feature of the theory. Rawls
remarks a number of times in contrasting his theory with utilitarianism
that under the Difference Principle no one is "expected . . .to accept
lower prospects of life for the sake of others." 9 But what this means,
as Rawls himself notes," is that no one is expected to take less than
others receive in order that the others may have a greater share. It
seems likely, however, that those who are endowed with talents which
are much in demand will receive less in a society governed by Rawls'
Difference Principle than they would if allowed to press for all they
could get on a free market. Thus, in a Rawlsian society these people
will be asked to accept less than they might otherwise have had, and
there is a clear sense in which they will be asked to accept these
58 d. 83. I will regard this as the canonical formulation of Rawls' principle. When
this version of the principle is fulfilled there is a clear sense in which prevailing in-
equalities are "to everyone's advantage" since there is no one who would benefit from
their removal. Fulfillment of the simple Difference Principle (that inequalities must
benefit the worst-off) insures fulfillment of the lexical principle only if expectations of
members of the society are " close knit"--it is impossible to alter the expectations of one
representative person without affecting the expectations of every other representative per-
son-and "chain connected"--if an inequality favoring group A raises the expectations
of the worst-off representative person B then it also raises the expectations of every
representative person between B and A. Id. 80-82.
69 1d. 178, 180.
70 Id. 103.
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smaller shares "for the sake of others." What, then, can be said to
these people?
Rawls' stated answer to this question consists in pointing out
that the well-being of the better endowed, no less than that of the
other members of society, depends on the existence of social coopera-
tion, and that they can "ask for the willing cooperation of everyone
only if the terms of the scheme are reasonable." 7 ' The Difference
Principle, Rawls holds, represents the most favorable basis of co-
operation the well-endowed could expect others to accept. Taken by
itself this does not seem an adequate response to the complaint of the
better endowed, for the question at issue is just what terms of co-
operation are "reasonable."
The particular notion of "reasonable terms" that Rawis is appeal-
ing to here is one that is founded in the conception of social coopera-
tion which he is propounding. The basis of this conception lies not in
a particular bias in favor of the less advantaged but in the idea that
economic institutions are reciprocal arrangements for mutual advan-
tage in which the parties cooperate on a footing of equality. Their
cooperative enterprise may be more or less efficient depending on the
talents of the members and how fully these are developed, but since
the value of these talents is something that is realized only in coopera-
tion the benefits derived from these talents are seen as a common
product on which all have an equal claim. Thus Rawls says of his Two
Principles that they "are equivalent . . . to an undertaking to regard
the distribution of natural abilities as a collective asset so that the
more fortunate are to benefit only in ways that help those who have
lost out.17
This same notion of the equality of the parties in a cooperative
scheme is invoked in the following intuitive argument for the Difference
Principle.
Now looking at the situation from the standpoint of one
person selected arbitrarily, there is no way for him to win
special advantages for himself. Nor, on the other hand, are
there grounds for his acquiescing in special disadvantages.
Since it is not reasonable for him to expect more than an
equal share in the division of social goods, and since it is
not rational for him to agree to less, the sensible thing for
him to do is to acknowledge as the first principle of justice
one requiring an equal distribution. Indeed, this principle is
so obvious that we would expect it to occur to anyone
immediately.
'11d.
72 1d. 179,
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Thus, the parties start with a principle establishing
equal liberty for all, including equality of opportunity, as
well as an equal distribution of income and wealth. But there
is no reason why this acknowledgment should be final. If
there are inequalities in the basic structure that work to
make everyone better off in Comparison with the benchmark
of initial equality, why not permit them?73
If one accepts equality as the natural first solution to the problem
of justice then this argument strongly supports the conclusion that the
Difference Principle marks the limit of acceptable inequality. More
surprisingly, it also appears to show (whether or not one accepts
equality as a first solution) that the Difference Principle is the most
egalitarian principle it would be rational to adopt. It is of course a
difficult empirical question how much inequality in income and wealth
the Difference Principle will in fact allow, i.e. how many economic
inequalities will be efficient enough to "pay their own way" as the
principle requires. The only theoretical limitation on such inequalities
provided by Rawls' theory appears to be the possibility that glaring
inequalities in material circumstances may give rise to (justified) feel-
ings of loss of self-respect 74 on the part of those less advantaged, off-
setting the material gains these inequalities bring them. One can thus
make the Difference Principle more (or less) egalitarian by introducing
a psychological premise positing greater (or lesser) sensitivity to per-
ceived inequality. But as far as I am able to determine there is no
plausible principle which is distinct from the Difference Principle and
intermediate between it and strict equality. Since the inequalities al-
lowed by the Difference Principle, while not great, may nonetheless
be significant, this strikes me as a suprising fact. What it shows, per-
haps, is that if one wishes to defend a position more egalitarian than
Rawls' then one must abandon distributive justice as the cardinal
virtue of social institutions, i.e. one must abandon the perspective
which takes as the dominant moral problem of social cooperation that
of justifying distributive institutions to mutually disinterested persons
731d. 150-51.
74 Inequalities give rise to loss of self-respect in Rawls' sense to the extent that they
give a person reason for lack of confidence in his own worth and in his abilities to carry
out his life plans. Id. 535. Whether given inequalities have this effect will depend not
only on their magnitude but also on the public reasons offered to justify them. Rawls
believes that effects of this kind will not be a factor in a society governed by the
Difference Principle since the inequalities in wealth and income in such a society will
not be extreme and will "probably [be] less than those that have often prevailed." Id.
536. In addition, the justification offered for those inequalities that do prevail will be
one which supports the self-esteem of the less advantaged since this justification must
appeal to the tendency of these inequalities to advance their good,
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each of whom has a fundamental interest in receiving the greatest
possible share of the distributed goods.75
The ideal of social cooperation which Rawls presents is naturally
contrasted with two alternative conceptions of justice. The first of
these is what Rawls calls the system of natural liberty.7 This con-
ception presupposes background institutions which guarantee equal
liberties of citizenship in the sense of the First Principle and preserve
formal equality of opportunity, i.e. "that all have at least the same
legal rights of access to all advantaged social positions.177 But no
effort is made to compensate for the advantages of birth, i.e. of inher-
ited wealth. Against the background provided by these institutions
individuals compete in a free market and are free to press upon one
another whatever competitive advantages derive from their different
abilities and circumstances.
The second alternative is that of utilitarianism, understood broadly
to include the two modified views presented at the end of the last
section. The last of those views differed from the versions of utilitarian-
ism criticized by Rawls in that it incorporated Rawls' principle that
no one may be asked to accept a less than equal share in order that
some others may enjoy correspondingly greater benefits. But even
though it is not simply a maximizing conception, this view is like other
forms of utilitarianism in holding it to be the duty of each person
to make the greatest possible contribution to the welfare of mankind.
Any asset one may have control over, whether a personal talent or a
transferable good, one is bound to disburse in such a way as to make
the greatest contribution to human well-being. 78 Utilitarianism is in
this sense an asocial view; the relation taken as fundamental by the
theory is that which holds between any two people when one has the
capacity to aid the other. Relations between persons deriving from
their position in common institutions, e.g. institutions of production
and exchange, are in themselves irrelevant. It would be possible to
maintain a view of this kind which focused only on the well-being of
7 5 A position of this kind was put forward, for example, by Kropotkin. See
P. KRoPOTxrw, THE CONQUEsT OF BRFAD 62, ch. 13, et passim (Penguin ed. 1972).
Kropotkin holds that if one accepts, as Rawls appears to, the view that the productive
capacities of a society must be seen as the common property of its members, then one
must reject the idea of wages (or any other way of tying distribution to social roles).
Rather, the social product is to be held in common and used to provide facilities which
meet the basic needs of all.
76 P Aw 72.
77 Id.
7 8 This aspect of utilitarianism is most clearly emphasized by William Godwin.
See 2 W. GODwvn, ENQumY CoNcERm( POLITICAL JusTIcE bk. VIII (3d ed. 1797)
(facsim. ed. F. Priestley 1946).
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members of a particular society, but such a restriction would appear
arbitrary. The natural tendency of utilitarian theories is to be global
in their application.
Rawls' Difference Principle can be seen as occupying a position
intermediate between these two extremes. Like the system of natural
liberty and unlike utilitarianism, Rawls' conception of justice applies
only to persons who are related to one another under common institu-
tions. The problem of justice arises, according to Rawls, for people
who are engaged in a cooperative enterprise for mutual benefit, and it
is the problem of how the benefits of their cooperation are to be shared.
What the parties in a cooperative scheme owe one another as a matter
of justice is an equitable share of this social product, and neither the
maximum attainable level of satisfaction nor the goods and services
necessary, given their needs and disabilities, to bring them up to a
certain level of well-being.
The qualification "as a matter of justice" is essential here since
justice, central though it is, is not the only moral notion for Rawls,
and other moral notions take account of need and satisfaction in a
way that justice does not. Rawls speaks, for example, of the duty of
mutual aid, "the duty of helping another when he is in need or jeop-
ardy, provided that one can do so without excessive risk or loss to
oneself. 79 Now it seems likely that those to whom we are bound by
ties of justice will fare better at our hands (or at least have a stronger
claim on us) than those to whom we owe only duties of mutual aid;
for justice, which requires that our institutions be arranged so as to
maximize the expectations of the worst-off group in our society, says
nothing about others elsewhere with whom we stand in no institutional
relation but who may be worse off than anyone in our society. If this
is so, then it may make a great deal of difference on Rawls' theory
where the boundary of society is drawn. Are our relations with the
people of South Asia, for example (or the people in isolated rural areas
of our own country), governed by considerations of justice or only by
the duties which hold between any one human being and another?
The only satisfactory solution to this problem seems to me to be to
hold that considerations of justice apply at least wherever there is
systematic economic interaction; for whenever there is regularized
commerce there is an institution in Rawls' sense, i.e. a public system
of rules defining rights and duties etc.80 Thus the Difference Principle
79 RAwLs 114.
80 ld. 55.
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would apply to the world economic system taken as a whole as well
as to particular societies within it.
In distinguishing justice from altruism and benevolence and taking
it to apply only to arrangements for reciprocal advantage Rawls'
theory is like the system of natural liberty. But a proponent of natural
liberty takes "arrangements for reciprocal advantage" in the relevant
sense to be arrangements arising out of explicit agreements. Such ar-
rangements are just if they were in fact freely agreed to by the parties
involved, and the background institutions of the system of natural
liberty are designed to ensure justice in this sense. Since Rawls' Differ-
ence Principle constrains people to cooperate on terms other than those
they would arrive at through a process of free bargaining on the basis
of their natural assets, it is to be rejected. As Rawls says, the terms
of this principle are equivalent to an undertaking to regard natural
abilities as a common asset, and a proponent of natural liberty would
say, I believe, that the terms of the principle apply only where such an
undertaking has in fact been made.
Rawls holds, on the other hand, that one is born into a set of
institutions whose basic structure largely determines one's prospects
and opportunities. Background institutions of the kind described in the
system of natural liberty are one example of such institutions; the
various institutions satisfying the Difference Principle are another.
Within the framework of such institutions one may enter into specific
contractual arrangements with others, but these institutions themselves
are not established by explicit agreement; they are present from birth
and their legitimacy must have some other foundation. The test of
legitimacy which Rawls proposes is, of course, the idea of hypothetical
contract, as it is embodied in his Original Position construction.
The argument sketched here is obviously parallel to a familiar
controversy about the bases of political obligation. The doctrine of
natural liberty corresponds to the doctrine which seeks to found all
political ties on explicit consent, and seems to me to inherit many of
the problems of that view. For Rawls, on the other hand, the legitimacy
of both political and economic institutions is to be analyzed in terms
of a merely hypothetical agreement. (Indeed, Rawls does not separate
the two cases.) The parallel between the problems of political institu-
tions and those of economic institutions is often obscured because the
political problem is thought of in terms of obligation while economic
justice is thought of in terms of distribution' But economic institu-
81 For a discussion of political obligation relevant to economic contribution as
well, see M. WA..zER, OBLIGATIONS (1970).
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tions, no less than political ones, must be capable of generating obliga-
tions, viz. obligations to cooperate on the terms these institutions
provide in order to produce the shares to which others are entitled. 2
The idea of such economic obligations raises a number of interest-
ing issues which I can only mention here. Such an obligation to con-
tribute would be violated, e.g., by a person who, while wishing to
receive benefits derived from the participation of others in a scheme of
cooperation satisfying the Difference Principle, refused to contribute
his own skills on the same terms, holding out for a higher level of
compensation than the scheme provided. Presumably obligations of
this kind do not in general prevent a person from' opting out of a
scheme of economic cooperation, any more than political obligation
constitutes a general bar to emigration; but this does not mean (in
either case) that people are always free to simply pick up and go.
Further, there obviously are limits to what a just scheme can demand
of those born into it and limits to how far their freedom to choose
among different forms of contribution can be restricted. It seems likely
that these limits would be defended, on Rawls' view, by appeal to an
increasing marginal preference for "economic liberty" relative to other
goods.
As I have argued above, the central thesis underlying the Differ-
ence Principle is the idea that the basic institutions of society are a
cooperative enterprise in which the citizens stand as equal partners.
This notion of equality is reflected in Rawls' particular Original Posi-
tion construction in the fact that the parties are prevented by the veil
of ignorance and the requirement that the principles they choose be
general (i.e. contain no proper names or token reflexives) from fram-
ing principles which ensure them special advantages. But the fact
that it would be chosen under these conditions is not a conclusive argu-
ment for the Difference Principle since a person who favored the
system of natural liberty would undoubtedly reject the notion that
principles of justice must be chosen under these particular constraints.
The situation here is similar to that of the argument against perfection-
ism: Rawls' defense of the Difference Principle must proceed in the
main by setting out the ideal of social cooperation of which this prin-
2 See RAwIS 313. The contribution side of the problem of economic justice is force-
fully emphasized in R. Nozicyc, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974) (forthcoming).
Nozick criticizes Raws from the perspective of a purely contractarian view much more
sophisticated and subtle than the system of natural liberty I have crudely described here.
83 These considerations alone, of course, do not ensure that the parties in the
Original Position will arrive at a principle of equal distribution even as a first solution.
Given that they have no way to ensure a larger share for themselves the question
remains whether they should settle for the maximin solution represented by the
Difference Principle or gamble on receiving a larger share under some other rule.
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ciple is the natural expression. The advantages of this ideal-e.g. the
fact that institutions founded on this ideal support the self-esteem
of their members and provide a public expression of their respect for
one another-can be set out, and its ability to account for our con-
sidered judgments of justice can be demonstrated, but in the end the
adoption of an alternative view is not wholly precluded. A person who,
finding that he has valuable talents, wishes to opt for the system of
natural liberty is analogous to the person who, knowing his own con-
ception of the good, prefers a perfectionist system organized around
this conception to what I have called "cooperation on a footing of
justice." In both cases one can offer reasons why cooperation with
others on a basis all could agree to in a situation of initial equality
is an important good, but one cannot expect to offer arguments which
meet the objections of such a person and defeat them on their own
grounds.
I do not regard this residual indeterminacy as a failing of Rawls'
book or as a source for skepticism. The conception of justice which
Rawls describes has an important place in our thought, and to have
presented this conception as fully and displayed its deepest features
as clearly as Rawls has done is a rare and valuable accomplishment.
Almost no one will read the book without finding himself strongly
drawn to Rawls' view at many points, and even those who do not share
Rawls' conclusions will come to a deeper understanding of their own
views as a result of his work.
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